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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
APEX LUMBER COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant
-vsCOMANCHE CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, RAYMOND CLARK,
AND MORONI FEED COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents
APEX LUMBER COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant

-vsCOMANCHE CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, RAYMOND CLARK
and D. A. SHAND,
Defendants-Respondents
APEX LUMBER COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant
-vsCOMANCHE CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, RAYMOND CLARK
and HOWARD WILLARDSEN",
Defendants-Respondents

APEX LUMBER COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant
-vsCOMANCHE CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, RAYMOND CLARK
and RICHARD JENSEN,
Defendants-Respondents

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Case No.
10414

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The Respondent agrees with the Appellant's statement
as to the kind of case. Defendants Moroni Feed Company, D
A. Shand, Howard Willardson and Richard Jensen denied
liability for the reason that the plaintiff-appellant so mixed up
materials between the thirteen different pole barn construction
jobs that it was not possible to determine 'Nhich materials
went into which pole barn. Each defendant claimed that he
had paid for all the material that went into his building. Each
Respondent claimed that the appellant was further estopped
from its claims against th'2 said Respondent because ~f a
telephone conversation advising respondents to make payment
to Comanche Construction Company.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Respondent's generally agree with the Appellant's
statement as to the disposition in the lower court. The parties
named as Comanche Construction Company and Raymond
Clark were never served in any of the four cases and neither
have ever entered an appearance.
The four cases were joined for purposes of trial and
were tried together before a jury. The Court propounded
six written questions in each case and the Jury answered the
questions in each case generally the same. The answers were
to the effect that the Appellant did furnish the materials that
went into the buildings, that the materials had been paid for
and that the plaintiff-appellant received a telephone call from
respondents before they made final payment, asking if payment should be made to Comanche or held up. That the
Appellant through a Mr. Rasmussen whom the jury held was
authorized to act, advised the Respondents to go ahead and
pay Comanche Construction Company for the buildings, which
they did.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents' deny that appellant should have a reversal of the lower court's judgment which was based upon special
verdicts submitted to the Jury. The entire course of conduct
by appellant with Raymond Clark and Comanche Construction
Company in the 13 constructed pole barns shows a confusion
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of material and payments.
The appellant's specific conduct with the Respondents
is an adequate basis for appellant's legal remedies to be estopped in equity. The Jury after hearing all the evidences
so found by its answers to special verdict, as did the lower
court in entering its decision of no cause of action in each of
the cases.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondents agree generally with the statement of
facts set forth in Appellant's brief.
Thirteen pole barn buildings were constructed starting
and ending with the dates stated. The plaintiffs witness Guy
Pittman, the Construction Supervisor, testified that men and
materials were shifted from one job to another. (T-80)
MR. TIBBS RE-CROSS EXAMINATION OF

PITTMAN.
"Q.
"A.
"Q.

GUY

You had fourteen men working for you, didn't you?
Approximately, Donald.
Your primary interest was keeping this labor
moving?
"A. That is right.
"Q. You were moving these men and these trucks and
this material to keep them busy. This is the
primary purpose, wasn't it?
"A. That is right.
"Q. And you kept them busy whether you had to move
some material over here or material over there
or anywhere you needed it, didn't you?
"A. That is right.
Other witnesses testified that the materials were moved
between the jobs - Charles DeVon Beck (P. 179 line 27),
Mark Christensen testified he loaned Comanche Construction
Company a truck which was used to haul materials between
jobs (P. 186), Cliff Blackham saw materials moving on trucks
(p. 191). The Respondents, Dick Jensen (p. 213-217), Howard
Willardsen (p. 223-224), Arthur Shand (234, 235, 240), all
saw materials moved to and from their premises.
The three Respondents (Shand, Jensen and Willardsen)
pole barns were the same size. The Respondent Moroni Feed
Company's pole barn was substantially larger, yet the amount
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appellant claimed from Moroni Feed Company was smaller
than the amounts claimed from some of the other Respondent
Defendants. In answer to questions concerning this problezn
the General Manager of Appellant stated: (T. 76)
CROSS EXAMINATION OF C. H. CHILD BY DON
V. TIBBS:
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

"Q.

(By Mr. Tibbs) Well, in any event Moroni Feed is
fifty percent, or fifty feet longer in length, pl\15
it also has the addition on; right?
Right. It should cost more money.
And so if the claimant was saying that there was
four thousand six hundred dollars, roughly, or
let's make it exact, four thousand six hundred
seventy-seven dollars eighty cents worth of materials in the Moroni Feed Company building, and
was saying there was four thousand nine hundred
forty dollars worth of materials in the Dick Jensen building there i.s something wrong. Isn't that
true?
It doesn't add up. The cost of your material in
these buildings costs roughly between sixty and
sixty-five cents a square foot.
E.specially doesn't add up when you analyze the
extra fifty feet, plus the extra thirty-two feet, does
it? Well, it doesn't add up, does it?

"A. No."

The appellant's basis for holding the respondents liable
for their materials was on the application of payments received
from Raymond Clark, doing business as Comanche Construction Company. One of the last pole barns constructed was
for Bruce Barton. He was never sued by Appellant. Seven
other law suits were filed. Mr. Child, Appellant's General
Manager applied an $8000.00 payment received from
Comanche Construction Company on the Barton obligation,
(a building constructed after the Respondents' buildings
were completed), rather than on Respondent's alleged
obligation. (T. 157). Mr. Bruce Barton testified (T. 188)
that he paid for his pole barn just like the other farmers,
and that he did not ask for lien waivers. (T. 189, Line 7).
Mr. Child, Appellant's General Manager, testified on
cross examination that the payments were applied to the old4

est job except for Barton payment. (T. 133, 134). His testimony at time of trial was compared with his testimony given
at the time of an earlier deposition on September 8, 1964.
(P. 157.)
"Q. (By Mr. Tibbs) Now, Mr. Child, on your direct
testimony you indicated that as to the application
of this eight thousand dollars that Mr. Clark came
in to your office in the Spring of 1961 when that
eight thousand dollars was paid, and you had a
conversation with him wherein at that time he
told you that eight thousand was to be applied
against the Barton obligation?
"A. That is correct.
"Q. Is that - and that Barton obligation was the last
job. Isn't that right?
"A. No. The Barton - "Q. Other than these two northern jobs?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And in the event he hadn't been in the office and
hadn't said to apply it that way, then it would
have applied earlier on the chain and would have
wiped out, according to your diagram and your
exhibit that was introduced, for all practical
purposes, the Shand and the Willardsen job. Isn't
that right?
"A. It woul.d And it would have put Barton in their
place.
"Q. That is right. Now in September 8, 1964, I took
your deposition in this matter. Isn't that true?
"A. That is correct.
"Q. And I asked you about the application of payment in that deposition to your recollection.
Isn't that true?
"A. That is correct.
"Q. And isn't it a fact that I asked you specifically
concerning this, and all you would answer to me
that it was just a possibility that this was the
case and that you at no time told me that there
was a direct conversation concerning this matter.
Isn't that true?
"A. I don't recall telling you that there was no conversation about the matter.
"Q. All right. May I read the deposition to you. This
is on, I am on page 22 of the deposition starting
at the last sentence - - - (down to page 159 line 7)

" 'Q.

"'A.
" 'Q.

I assume by that you said, then, that the reason the other, that this last group of jobs.
this last six, which also includes Barton and
Mark Christensen. as I recall, the reason
that they weren't sued, was because at the
time the money was sent a specific lien waiver was asked upon those jobs. Is that correct':'
Well, this is a possibility.

Either that or the jobs were ordered before
these particular jobs were ordered?
"'A. Right.
"'Q. The others?
"'A. Yes.
"'Q. When these invoices or these cheks were
received from Clark or Comanche Company
or Comanche Lumber, did the checks themselves specify on whose account they were
to apply?
" 'A. They were not.
"'Q. None. Is that correct?
"'A. Only the ones in which he requested lien
waivers, and he would say this check includes payment for the particular job and
please furnish me a lien waiver on it. I
assume, that is the way you said, I assume.
" 'Q. So that that would have been a separate letter correspondence rather than by the check
itself. Is that correct?
"'A. That is correct.
" 'Q. So that once again the drafts or checks themselves individually would not specify any
particular account which they were to be
applied against?
"'A. Correct.
" 'Q. And it was correspondence which came with
the draft?
"'A. Yes.
" 'Q. Do you have this correspondence?
"'A. No. I do not.
"'Q. Is that your testimony?
"'A. It is.

6

"Q.

"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

(By Mr. Tibbs) Let me just read the next question and answer. After you said no, I do not,
I said:
"'Q. Did you return it or did you keep it?
"'A. Well, this happened four years ago and I am
not sure. Sometimes it would appear on just
a hand-written note with check, please mail
me a lien waiver for such and such a job,
and I just didn't keep it at all, where it may
have been in a letter relative to some other
item, and I just didn't keep all that correspondence.
" 'Q. The way you answer this indicates that maybe the check came in an envelope and there
was a sheet of paper with the check which
says please send me a waiver for Bruce
Barton's job?
" 'A. That is a possibility.
In any event now you say it didn't happen that
way at all. Now he crone specifically in to your
office and he handed you the check for eight
thousand dollars and he said apply this on Bruce
Barton's account. That is correct? That is your
testimony now?
Regarding the eight thousand dollar check, Mr.
Clark brought that in hand to my office.
That is in variance with your prior testimony, is
it not?
No. I think it is not.

Obviously this evidence shows a misapplication of the
$8,000.00 payment. The manager Child was flock shooting
whichever builder-farmer he thought he could get payment
from. His first testimony was that he applied the $8,000.00
based upon correspondence, (which was never in existence),
then at the time of trial he applied the payment on Barton
Pole barn based on an oral conversation, which Barton has
no knowledge of and which was never requested by Barton
from Comanche Construction Company.
There was also evidence presented wherein the appellant by its General Manager C. H. Child received two Pro-
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mi!':sot·y Notes. The Respondents cuntendcd these noi.cs were
taken in satisfaction c.nd payment of the Apex account with
Raymond Clark, doing business as Comanche Ccnstruction
Company. The Court refused to submit this to the Jury over
the objection of Respondents' cow1sel. See Instructions that
were denied.
The Jury undoubtedly considered this in its Answer
to Special Verdict question No. 3. However, even if they did
and should not have, there was sufficient other evidence to
subst;;:.ntiate the basis of their answers to the question. This
was so four:.d by the court.
Although the Respondents rely particularly upon the
doctrine of estoppel it is noted that based upon the circumstances herein involved the question of payment because of
the acceptance of the Promissory notes should have been
submitted to the Jury. Originally appellant was dealing with
Raymond Clark doing business as Comanche Construction.
After the transaction occurrE'<l a corporation was formed
known as Comanche Construction Company, Inc. The account
between Clark and Apex Lumber was in dispute as shown
by the Exhibits 47 and 48. Two Promissory Notes were delivered by the third party, Comanche Construction Company,
a corporation, for a sum certain. See Exhibit 35 and 36. These
notes provided for interest different from the open account
and were given as security. The fact that they were
not subsequently paid should not say they were not accepted
as payment, and it should have been a question for the Jury
to determine, if, in fact, they had been taken as payment.
This the Jury apparently did in its answer to question No. 3.
The fact that they did should not now be determined to have
affected all other payment and evidence presented in the case.
There was also evidence to the effect that some of the
appellant's billings were not correct as to the materials that
went into the particular buildings. Appellant's testimony as
to the nails is a good example. (T. 138)
CROSS EXAMINATION OF APPELLANT GENERAL

MANAGER CIBLD.
"Q.

So that on this particular job there is roughly four
hundred pounds of particular nails which on the
other job there is about one hundred pounds. Is
8

"A.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

that right? Is that right?
That is correct.
And then there is another four hundred pounds
of nails just below that, where on the other jobs
there is what, three hundred pounds?
That is correct.
So there is quite a substantial variance of nails
between Richard Jensen's job and Art Shand's job,
for example, isn't there?

Yes. And these nails would be twenty-five dollars
per keg, so there is seventy-five dollars difference
worth of nails on the two.
"Q. But the point is, and you understand this point,
that if the nails didn't go into Mr. Jensen's job
then h~ shouldn't have to pay for the nails, should
he?
"A. No.
"Q. Not under this theory that you are proceeding
under. Actually in this theory, he should only pay
for the materials that went in that have not been
paid for. Isn't that true?
"A. That is correct.

"A.

The Respondents testified, Arthur Shand (T. 236-238),
Howard Willardsen, (T. 224, 225, 230, 232), Richard Jensen
(T. 214, T. 219), and Moroni Feed by Clifford Blackham (T.
193, 195, 198, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212.) that they became concerned about Comanche Construction Company not
paying their suppliers and labors, consequently, before making their final payment the Respondents (Moroni Feed, Howard Willardsen and Art Shand for himself and Richard Jensen) in Clifford Blackham's office phoned Appellants and
were advised by H. J. Rasmussen, of Appellant Company,
who had issued a prior lien waiver on Clifford Blackham's
personal pole barn job, to make their payments to Comanche
Construction Company. In the event Appellant hadn't advised them to so pay, they wouldn't have made the payments.
The appellant's General Manager, C. H. Child testified
that appellant employed H. J. Rasmussen as a bookkeeper,
but that he did not have any authority to issue lien waivers.
(T. 149, line 11)
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TIBBS CROSS EXAMINATION C. H. CHILD:
"Q.

"A.
"Q.
"A.
"Q.
''A.

:rvlr. Child, did Apex Lumber and Hardware Company have a man by the name of H. R. Rasmussen
employed for it in 1960 and '61?
l\Ir. Rasmussen was a bookkeeper at Apex Lumbe r.
And so he was an employee working in the office
Is that right?
.
That is correct.
Did he have authority to issue lien waivers?
He did not.
(Thereupon, Defendants Exhibit No. 43
was marked for identification.)

"Q.

"A.

"Q.
"A.
"Q.

"A.

(By Mr. Tibbs.) I hand you what has been markt:d as Defendants. Exhibit Nu. t3. and ask you what
that is?
Receipt and waiver for one dollar for. doesn't say
to whom. Doesn't say. Oh. Comanche Construction Company. It is on there.
And it has for Comanche Constrncti0n for Clifford
Blackham job. Isn't that what it says on it?
That is correct.
So at least in this case he had authority to issue
a lien waiver for this particular job. Isn't that
true?
Yes it is.

There were two Exhibits No. 43 and No. 53. both lien
waivers which were signed by Appellant (H. J. Rasmussen).
one was issued to Clifford Blackham (Exhibit No. 43) for his
personal job and the other was issued to Ray Olsen (Exhibit
No. 53), for his pole barn construction.
Mr. Child, Appellant's General Manager, reluctantly
admitted that it might have been done at his direction. (T. 270)
"Q. Yes. Now you also stated on rebuttal, as I understand it, that Mr. Rasmussen had no authority
to sign these lien waivers?
"A. I also stated on direct testimony he had no authority.
"Q. But be that as it may, we have two jobs here, at
least as to Cliff Blackham's and as to Mr. Olsen's.
that he did execute a lien waiver. Is that true?
10

''A.
"Q.

"A.

''Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

'·.,:1,__

"Q.

"A.
"Q.
"A.

Signed on the "ame day and obviously at my
direction.
So that at least for these two jobs he had authority tu execute lien waivers. Is that right?
Authority delegated by me.
But that doesn't show on the lien waivers, does it?
It is not.
Is it your position that these lien waivers are no
good then as to these two jobs?
It is not.
So you are holding them out as having authority
to do it, and did at that time, aren't you?
If I directed it.
In November, at this time these two liens waivers
were signed, you held him out to these individual<;
as that he had authority to execute lien waivers,
did you not"'
This is December. Tvir. Tibbs.
All right. In December of 1960, when these two
lien waivers were issued, you held them out and
Apex Lumber held them out as having authority
to issue lien waivers?
In these two cases.
Well, you held him out, didn't you?
In these two cases.

The Lien Waivers for two of the 13 pole barns constructed were issued by H. J. Rasmussen for Appellant. Clifford Blackham testified that before any of the four Respondents herein named paid for the materials on these jobs that
he phoned Apex Lumber Company, talked to H. J. Rasmussen,
the man who signed his lien waiver, about the Respondents
paying the balance due to Comanche Lumber (T. 204-212)
and the Respondents' concern. Each of the respondents testified they paid the final payment due under their contracts
in reliance on the telephone call made to appellant. The only
reason they phoned appellant was to hold up payment in the
event the appellant claimed funds for materials. (T. 212, T.

214. T. 230, 232, T. 244.)

ARGUMENT
APPELLANT'S POINT I.

The undisputed evidence proves
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that plaintiff not only supplied the materials used by
the contractor in constructing the building on defend.
ants' land, but received only partial payment for the
value of said materials.
RESPONDENTS' ANSWER:
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS
THAT APPELLANT FURNISHED SOME MATERIALS FOR 13 DIFFERENT POLE BARN CONSTRuc.
TION JOBS, THAT MATERIALS WERE MOVED
FROM JOB TO JOB AND THAT CONSTRUCTION
ON THE JOBS WAS TAKING PLACE SIMULTAN.
EOUSLY. THAT IN THE EVENT THE PAYMEN'fs
HAD BEEN PROPERLY APPLIED ALL MATERIALS
THAT COULD HAVE BEEN USED FOR RESPOND.
ENTS' POLE BARNS WOULD HAVE BEEN PAID.
The Comanche Construction Company contracted to
build 13 pole barns for different owners. Not one of the owners obtained a Contractor's Bond and each paid in full to
Comanche Construction Company the contracted amount.
Approximately a year after they had all been completed and
paid for, the appellant filed suit against these Respondents
and three others. Two suits were compromised, one was dismissed. The third from the last of the thirteen pole barns
was constructed for Bruce Barton. He was not sued because
Appellant's General Manager, C. H. Child stated he was
orally advised by Raymond Clark to apply a certain $8,000.00
payment on this Barton account. Barton testified he never
even asked for any lien waiver. Mr. Child on his deposition
stated the request came from Clark in writing (which he
couldn't find) then at the time of trial (more than a year
after deposition) he testified Clark told him personally. The
conflict is shown in the statement of facts.
There was a confusion of material between the 13 different jobs as there was a confusion of funds received for payment on the account.
Guy L. Pittman, the General Supervisor for Comanche
Construction Company in Utah testified: (T. 78, line 29)
"Q.

"A.

In regards to the material that was hauled back
and forth between jobs, how substantial was this
haulage back and forth?
You mean how much of it was hauled?
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"Q.

Yes.

"A.

Back and forth. Well, sometimes we would probably get a whole semi load of just three by threes
in, and this was distributed to different jobs by
our truck because most of these big semis would
make one stop.

"Q.

In this case v. rould you leave enough to complete

''A.
'·Q.
·'.\.

the job at the initial site of unloading and then
distribute the rest?

That is what we usually tried to do. The same
thing happened on poles.
And was this uncommon or common?
This was a common procedure.

APPELLANT'S POINT II. The undisputed evidence proves
1.hat under the provisions of 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 of Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, plaintiff has a cause
of action against defendants for the unpaid value of
materials supplied by plaintiff and used in the construction of buildings on defendants' land.
RESPONDENTS' ANSWER: THERE WAS SUCH A CONFUSION IN THE USE OF MATERIALS FOR THE 13
POLE BARNS CONSTRUCTED AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF PAYMENTS THAT THE APPELLANT
HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS.
The Respondents admit they did not obtain the bond
required m1der 14-2-1 Utah Code Annotated. However, the
cause of action only arises in favor of the materialman when
"payment for which has not been made". (14-2-1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953). In this case the Jury in answer to a special Question by the Court stated that payment had been
made in full.
Guy L. Pittman, General Supervisor of Comanche Construction Company (T. 40) testified that each of the Respondents paid for the materials by checks made payable to Comanche.
Cliff Blackham testified that before the checks were
delivered the Respondents were concerned over whether the
material and labor had been paid for, so that he acting for
13

them phoned appellant to determine if payment should be paid
to Comanche. On (T. 192) Blackham testified:

"A.
"Q.
"A.
''Q.

"A.

"A.

On

"Q.

"A.

Mr. Shand and Mr. Willardsen came to my office
because they were concerned about paying for,
making the final payments on the buildings.
Do you recall when this date was?
I think it is the 23rd of January, based on my
telephone bill.
When you say they were concerned about making
the payments on the barn, what do you mean by
that?
They wanted to be sure that the materials and
labor were paid for and that when they paid their
money the thing would be properly closed.
. then on Page 195, Line 12, Mr. Blackham stated:
Well, I placed a call to Scherer Brothers Lumber
Company in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Apex
Lumber Company in Salt Lake City to Mr. Rasmussen, because Mr. Rasmussen had signed my
lien waiver from Apex on my own personal building. At the time I gave my deposition I didn't
remember who I spoke to, when I checked it out
with the telephone company and got their information I had talked to Mr. Rasmussen. And Mr.
Rasmussen told us, told me that the accounts were
clear and it was clear to go ahead and make the
final payment to Apex Lumber Company. (Later
corrected to mean Comanche Construction Company - Page 197, line 4 through line 9). And on
this basis of this information these men went out
and paid for the buildings and we paid for our
Feed Company building, the final payment.
Page 197 Mr. Blackham also testified:
Mr. Blackham, at my request did you also contact the telephone company in Moroni to ask them
if they had any records concerning this telephone
call on January 23, 1961?
That is correct.

Exhibit No. 50 is the telephone company record of the
call. Exhibit 51 is the telephone bill of Moroni Feed Com·
pany of the call. Exhibit 52 is Clifford Blackham's notes.
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Exhibit 43 and 53 are lien waivers on two jobs (Blackham and
Olsen) which show that Mr. Rasmussen issued lien waivers
on two of the 13 pole barns constructed and that appellant
held l1im out as being authorized to issue waivers. Obviously
this appellant is estopped from complaining now after having
adviocd these respondents to make payment as they did.
APPELLANT'S POINT III.
The court erred in accepting
the Jury's answer to question three of the special verdict, wherein the jury found that acceptance by plaintiff
of contractor's unsecured promissory notes cOhstituted
payment in full.
RESPONDENTS' ANSWER: THE COURT'S DECISION OF
NO CAUSE OF ACTION WAS BASED UPON THE
JURY'S ANSWERS TO ALL WRITTEN QUESTIONS,
AND NOT JUST AS TO QUESTION NO. 3. EVIDENCE ABOUNDS THROUGHOUT THE RECORD
UPON WHICH THE JURY FOUND THAT PAYMENT
IN FULL HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY APPELLANT.
Respondents contend that the Jury's answer to this
question does not indicate that the jury relied solely upon the
promissory notes as being payment. The manner of the payments from Raymond Clark and Comanche Construction Company would be reason enough for the jury to hold that appellants had been paid. The matter of the Barton check and its
application to the last job rather than to prior jobs is another
reason the jury found payment. The jury could also have
found payment by reason of the telephone call from Respondents to appellant which has been discussed.
In regards to the Promissory Note theory of payment
which respondents argued without success to the court
throughout the trial in the absence of the jury. Respondent
contends it is not now material because the jury found payment without reliance upon it, instead relying upon the appellant's being estopped because of the telephone call.

However, Respondents did seriously contend that even
without the telephone call the acceptance of the two Promissory Notes from the third party Comanche Construction
Company, a corporation, by appellant under these circumstances where the notes were given by a third party, for an
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increased interest rate and for security for payment on a disputed claim the question of whether or not they were payment
should have been a question for the Jury and not the Court.
See Tangaro vs. Manero, 13 Ut. 2nd 290, 40 Am. Jur. 2
p. 715. See also 40 American Jurisprudence Section 92 p 781
where it states that "the question whether a note is given and
accepted as payment ordinarly is a question for the jury and
the burden of proving this fact is upon the one having the
affirmative of this issue.
So also payment to an authorized agent will discharge
the indebtedness, although the agent misappropriates the payment - 40 Am. Jur. Section 154, 94 ALR 779, 8 ALR 198.
It is also well settled that a Note of the debtor, although
unsecured, which is accepted by creditor in satisfaction of an
unliquidated or disputed claim, operated in accord and satisfaction barring an action on the original claim or debt. See
Smoot vs. Checketts, 41 Ut. 211, 125 Pac. 412, 62 ALR 752.
Where a third person makes the note as the corporation did
in this case where before it was only the debt of an individual
Restatement of Contracts, Section 421, and in 62 ALR 758
cites cases holding payment regardless whether the note was
paid.
But regardless of this Note theory the payment question
is no longer important because of the jury's answers to question which gave the court reason to hold appellants estopped
by reason of its conduct.
APPELLANT'S POINT IV.
The court erred in accepting
the Jury's answer to Question Three of the Special
Verdict, wherein the Court found that plaintiff's recovery from the defendant was barred by estoppel.
RESPONDENTS' ANSWER:
THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO
THE COURT'S QUESTIONS 3, 4 AND 5 WERE
BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRODUCED
AT THE TRIAL AND CONSTITUTED A SUFFICIENT
BASIS FOR THE COURT TO HOLD THAT THE
APPELLANT WAS BARRED FROM RECOVERY BY
REASON OF ESTOPPEL.
As above stated in answer to appellant's Point II Guy
Pittman, Supervisor for Comanche Construction Company,
collected by check the sums due for materials from respond-
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ents. These respondents only made payment based upon the
telephone conversation by Clifford Blackham with Mr. Rasmussen of appellant company. These respondents phoned to
appellant because they were concerned that all materials be
paid for. Appellant instructed them to pay as they did and
appellant should be estopped from nov. - denying payment.
Blackham on (T 207) was asked by Attorney for Appellant.
"Q.

What you desired from Mr. Rasmussen of Apex
was not whether materials were paid for but
whether Comanche Construction Company was in
default or behind with Apex Lumber?
"The Court:
Now do you have the question clearly in
mind? If not, we will have the report read it.
"The Witness:
I have it in mind.
"The Court:
All right, You may answer.
"My answer is that I simply wanted assurance that the
final payments could be made without any complications of legal action such as we are having
today. I received that assurance from Mr. Rasmussen and on that basis we went ahead and made
final payments on these buildings.
Then on Line 13 he answered Mr. Griffith's further
question:
"Mr. Griffiths: Did you understand that the Shand job
or the Willardsen job were completed?
"A. I remember this much that I understand that
these men were faced with the final payment right
away and they wanted information as to whether
or not they should make this payment and still be
safe. And that is why we made the calls. I made
no survey as to the status of these buildings.
The Respondent Moroni Feed Company paid based upon
the telephone call to Appellant. See Mr. Blackham Testimony
on Page 210, line 8.
"Q. So I rephrase my question to you, Mr. Blackham.
Did you expect the materials to have been paid
for on January 23, for your job?
"A. When I talked to him on January 23, the assurance
I received at that time that it was, that we could
pay our bills, must have carried forth with me
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until this time when I made final payment because
we made these payments on the basis of what we
learned from Apex Lumber Company's Mr. Rasmussen."
On Page 212 Mr. Blackham answered further:
MR. TIBBS:
"Q. Do you have any other reason that you would
call Apex Lumber Company?
"A. No reason. No other reason.
The Respondent Richard Jensen paid his account based
on this telephone call. (T. 214).
"Q. Mr. Jensen, prior to your paying Comanche Construction Company did you have occasion to talk
to anyone else concerning whether or not to pay
Comanche Construction Company?
"A. Oh, yes. I was much concerned and I talked to
Art Shand. Art Shand said they had made an
investigation and as far as he could see it was all
right. He paid his. When he said that Cliff Blackham had made the calls to Apex and different
companies that had furnished the material.
''Q. Did you prior to your making this payment know
about this telephone call of Cliff Blackham's?
"A. Oh, yes, I remember I talked to Cliff Blackham
in his office when I was after feed before I made
the payment besides talking to Arthur Shand.
"Q. Was it based upon this information that you inquired about that you made the final payment?
"A. Yes.
The Respondent Howard Willardsen paid his account
based upon the telephone call. (T. 224)
"A. There was a local man by the name of Neff DeLeeuw employed by Comanche Construction Company and he informed me during the construction
of my building that they were defaulting on their
payments, getting behind on their payments on
their labor. For this reason, and two others, I was
very concerned about the solvency of Comanche
Construction Company.
"Q. So what did you do?
"A. Well, before I made final payment, together with
Art Shand, we went to the office of Clifford Black-
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ham asking advice. We have a lot of respect for
Cliff. And he said he thought he should call the
suppliers of material and see if Comanche was solvent so to speak.
Do you recall when this was, when it was you
went to Cliff Blackham?
"A. In my deposition I couldn't, but of course since
we have traced this phone call. It is January 23.
"Q. I see, now do you - - what happened on that time
to the best of your recollection.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.
"A.
"Q.
"A.
"Q.
"A.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.
"A.

"Q.

"A.
"Q.
"A.
"Q.

The call was placed to the company in Minnes941
and Apex Lumber Company.
Were you present when this call was placed?
I was present when the call was placed.
Where were you at?
In the office of Clifford Blackham at Moroni.
Who else was present?
Art Shand.
So the three of you were sitting there. Is that
correct?
That is correct.
And what happened?
Well, of course I don't know, I didn't speak myself, but we received assurance from Cliff that it
was all right with Comanche Construction, with
Apex Lumber if we paid Comanche because apparently they were solvent and they had no concern about Comanche paying their bills. Certainly
I wouldn't have paid it if I hadn't of had this
assurance.
And was it based upon this assurance that you
heard during this conversation that you made this
payment?
That is correct.
Now that was on November, or correction, that
phone call was on January 23 and you made the
payment on January 28. Is that correct?
Correct. Correct.
(By Mr. Tibbs) When you were sitting in this
office did you hear Mr. Blackham talking on the
phone?
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"A. I did.
The Respondent Arthur Shand paid his account based
upon the· Telephone Call. (T. 238)
"Q. Was it based upon this conversation with Apex
Lumber Company that you paid this bill?
"A. Absolutely.
''Q. Did you have occasion to talk to Mr. Jensen
sometime during this period?
"A. I talked with Mr. Jensen several times. In fact
he kind of relied on me to get this information
because he was out there on the farm. And he
asked me if I, to give him any information that
I could gather. And I did. I both went out to
see him and I called him on the phone, and he
called me on the phone.
"Q. Yoll told him about your going up and your
phoning to make out, make sure it was all right
to pay then?
"A. Yes. I also called him and told him not to pay
it prior to this, a week or so.
Then again on Re-direct examination of Mr. Arthur
Shand:
BY MR. TIBBS;
"Q. Would you have paid it if Apex Lumber hadn't,
had told you not to?
"A. No Sir, I would not.
"Q. You paid it in reliance upon the conversation of
that telephone call in Cliff Blackham's office. Is
that correct?
"A. Absolutely.
The doctrine of equitable Estoppel must always be so
applied as to promote the ends of justice and accomplisli that
which ought to be done between man and man. Each case
of Estopple must in the nature of things stand on its own
bottom. 19 Am Jur Section 33, 106 ALR 1169.
The cases themselves must be looked to and applied
by way of analogy rather than rule. Equitable Estoppel is
the principle by which a party who knows or should know
the truth is absolutely precluded both by law and in equity,
from denying, or asserting the contrary of any material fact
which, by his words or conduct, has induced another, who
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had right to rely on it, to believe and act upon them thereby
changing his position in such a way that he would
suffer injury if such denial or contrary assertion were allowed
- Public Utilities Commission vs. Jones, 54 Utah 111, 179
p 745.
In our case these Respondents because of what they
had heard became concerned that the'ir payment on their respective contracts would not go to pay the laborman and the
materialman. They were Farmers, they didn't know anything about Contractors Bonds, but they wanted in all fairness
to protect the labors and materiahnen. They did what was
reasonable by telephoning to this particular materiahnen Appellant to find out if they should pay the contract or should
hold up to give appellant some protection. Appellant told
them to go ahead and pay. He should be precluded now from
saying: Well I made a mistake I shouldn't be bound. Let
them pay again. Don't make me suffer because I led them
to pay this person Raymond Clark with whom I was dealing.
As the testimony indicated the only purpose of the
call was to determine what the Respondents should do in regards to making the payment. Appellant told them to pay.
Comanche Construction Company. If appellant had not told
them to pay respondents would not have paid. The Respondents' payment was clearly based upon Appellant's answer on
the telephone call.
The court after receiving the Jury's answer to the question concerning the telephone call had the obligation to decide
whether or not the facts gave rise to an estoppel. This the
Court did in rendering its decision of no cause of action.
App~llant would have this high court on appeal believe
that there was no estoppel because there was no false representation by appellant and allegedly that the respondents knew
at the time of final payment that the materials had not been
paid. This is not so.
An actual intent to mislead or defraud is not essential
to the creation of an equitable estoppel. (19 Am Jur, Section
46.) An intention to influence the action of the particular
person claiming the estoppel is not necessary in all cases. It
is enough if there was a holding out to all who might have
occasion to act on the existence of a certain state of facts
which they might assume to be true and upon which they
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might act. The result of the particular conduct rather then
intent is the criterion.

~e

In our case payment would not· have been made but
for appellant's action on the telephone. To allow appellant
to now say Respondents should not be harmed by its telling
them to pay would not be fair. The respondents had a right
to pay based upon this telephone conversation and the appellants, as the court found, were estopped.
APPELLANT'S POINT V.
The Jury's Answers to the Interrogatories of the Special Verdict are not supported
by the evidence, and the court erred in failing to direct
a verdict for thP plaintiff notwithstanding the special
verdict.
RESPONDENTS' ANSWER:
COURTS QUESTIONS
EVIDENCE.

THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO

"ARE

SUPPORTED BY THE

Respondents deny the conclusion that the verdict was
not supported by evidence. As heretofore set forth in this
brief evidence is in abundance as to confusion of materials
between jobs.
The jury found there was no unpaid materials. The
evidence would warrant this finding based on either the jury
treating the payments made by Clark should have been applied against these respondents job, Barton check is good
example, or that the payments made were based on the telephone conversation.
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CONCLUSION
There is nothing in the record to indicate the Jury
failed to answer the court's questio~ properly. The answers
must all be read together with all the evidence as shown
by the record.
Tile trial court properly held that the Appellant has
no cause of action_ag<!_inst the Respondents. To have held
otherwise ':~~d have been-a mis~~:riage of Justice.
Respectful

\

'~

~

Attorney for DefendantsRespondents
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